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Abstract 
Gerontologists have proposed different concepts for aging well such as 
“successful aging“, “active aging”, and “healthy aging”. These conceptions are 
primarily focused on maintaining health and preventing disease. But these 
conceptions also raise the questions of what a good life in old age is and how it 
can be achieved. While medical in origin, these concepts and strategies for aging 
well also contain ethical advice for individuals and societies on how to act 
regarding aging and old age. This connection between gerontology and ethics is 
overlooked on both sides. We thus develop this research program for a systematic 
geroethics in four steps. First, we analyze „successful aging“ as put forward by 
Rowe and Kahn as a paradigmatic example for a gerontological conception of 
aging well. Then, in a second step, we move from criticisms within gerontology to 
an ethical perspective; in particular, we want to clarify the problem of the claim of 
universal validity of conceptions of the good life. In a third constructive step, we 
explain how the “capabilities approach” could be applied in this context as a 
normative foundation for the implicit normative assumptions of gerontological 
conceptions of aging well, such as a particular choice of functionings, the ethical 
relevance of human agency, and the resulting claims of individuals towards 
society. Finally, using a conception by the German philosopher Ursula Wolf, we 
systematically develop the different aspects of the connection between aging well 
and the theory of the good life in their full complexity and show their 
interconnectedness.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Gerontologists have proposed different concepts and strategies of aging well such 
as “successful aging“1, “active aging”2, and “healthy aging”.3 These concepts and  
strategies for “aging well” are not just directed toward individuals but are also 
aimed at the social context of aging and old age. They intend to help guide how 
societies can deal with the perceived challenges of an aging population such as 
rising old-age-dependency ratios, and health care and pension costs. Therefore 
different national and international organisations such as the European Union4, 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development5, and the World 
Health Organisation6 often refer to these conceptions in their policy suggestions 
in order to meet the challenges of population aging. 
The gerontologist Robert Havighurst provided an early overview of different 
definitions of “successful aging“ in 1961. 7  Havighurst contrasted two main 
positions in gerontology: the “disengagement-model”8 and his own “activity-
                                                          
1 J.W. Rowe & R.L. Kahn. Human aging: usual and successful. Science 1987; 237: 143-149, J. 
Rowe & R.L. Kahn. 1998. Successful aging. 1st ed edn. New York: Pantheon Books: xv, 265 
p. ;, J. Rowe & R.L. Kahn. Successful Aging 2.0: Conceptual Expansions for the 21st Century. 
The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 2015. 
2 L. Foster & A. Walker. Active and Successful Aging: A European Policy Perspective. The 
Gerontologist 2015; 55: 83-90. Fernández-Ballesteros, et al. Active Aging: A Global Goal. 
Current Gerontology and Geriatrics Research 2013 
3 R. Sadana, et al. Healthy Ageing: Raising Awareness of Inequalities, Determinants, and 
What Could Be Done to Improve Health Equity. Ibid. 2016; 56: S178-S193. 
4 E. Commission. 2015. Innovation and Active Ageing Summit Report. 
5 P. Love (ed.). 2015. Ageing. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
6 J.R. Beard, et al. The World report on ageing and health: a policy framework for healthy 
ageing. Lancet 2016; 387: 2145-2154. 
7 R.J. Havighurst. Successful Aging. The Gerontologist 1961; 1: 8-13.. 
8 E. Cumming & W.E. Henry. 1961. Growing old : the process of disengagement. N.Y.: Basic 
Bks. 
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model” of successful aging.9 The first model describes and also recommends a 
withdrawal of older people from society. This is a combination of descriptive 
elements – what the situation of older people actually is – and normative 
elements – how older people should behave to lead a good life. In contrast, the 
“activity model”, which is now the dominant approach10, argues that, empirically, 
older people in contemporary societies are increasingly engaged in different kinds 
of activities and that, normatively, they should do so, both to their own benefit 
and for the benefit of society. The “activity model of aging” is the category under 
which “healthy aging”, “successful aging“, and “active aging” fall.11  
After Havighurst’s groundbreaking article the American discussion was largely 
influenced by the concept of “successful aging” proposed and developed by Rowe 
and Kahn.12 This conception has also become a point of reference for critical 
discussion.13 “Active aging” is the counterpart shaping European debates and 
policies and focuses on the employment situation of older people.14 As already 
mentioned above, “healthy aging,” “active aging”, and “successful aging” are not 
merely descriptive but also normative concepts. Their normative content has a 
double aspect. Firstly, they put forward criteria to measure desirable outcomes. 
These can also be understood as evaluative reasons what kind of life older people 
should consider as good. Secondly, they provide recommendations about what 
individuals and society should do in order to achieve these outcomes. 
Consequently, the gerontological conceptions of aging well refer to aging as a 
                                                          
9 See also W.A. Achenbaum. 1995. Crossing frontiers. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press: 
XIII, 278 S ;. 
10K.J. Johnson & J.E. Mutchler. The Emergence of a Positive Gerontology: From 
Disengagement to Social Involvement. The Gerontologist 2014; 54: 93-100. 
11 Foster and Walker 2015, op. cit. note 2. 
12 See note 1. 
13 For an overview see a recent special issue by the Gerontologist dedicated to Rowe and 
Kahn’s concept: Successful Aging: Contentious Past, Productive Future. The Gerontologist 
2015; 55: 1-4. 
14 Foster and Walker 2015, op. cit. note 2. 
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process which should be designed in a specific way, and to a specific form or 
shape of old age as a desirable outcome both for individuals and society, which 
can be achieved by an optimized aging process.  
The common ground of these models of aging well is that they all refer to specific 
activities which they consider to be important for aging well and for flourishing in 
old age. The proponents of different models disagree about which activities 
should count as criteria for aging well and critics attack the respective choices.15 A 
more fundamental type of criticism addresses the focus on activity itself.16 A 
substantial part of the critical literature relates to the normative foundations of 
each concept, for instance, the justification of a particular choice of activities or, 
more fundamentally, the relevance of functioning and agency in general.17 Via 
these issues and the related criticisms the gerontological debate enters the 
domain of ethical questions: What are the activities people have reason to value 
and what is the ethical importance of agency in general? However, there is little 
awareness in the gerontological literature of this connection between gerontology 
and ethics, in particular, relating to the theory of a good life.18 Conversely, ethics 
has shown little interest in these practical concepts of good aging and in the 
question of the good life in old age.  
From an ethical perspective, the strategies for “successful aging” and their 
counterparts can be characterized as prudential recommendations for how to 
attain happiness, human flourishing, and a good life under the specific 
                                                          
15 A. Bowling & P. Dieppe. What is successful ageing and who should define it? Bmj 2005; 
331: 1548-1551, M. Martinson & C. Berridge. Successful aging and its discontents: a 
systematic review of the social gerontology literature. Gerontologist 2015; 55: 58-69. 
16 V. Timonen. 2016. Beyond successful and active ageing : a theory of model ageing. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, C. Tesch-Romer & H.W. Wahl. Toward a More 
Comprehensive Concept of Successful Aging: Disability and Care Needs. The journals of 
gerontology Series B, Psychological sciences and social sciences 2017; 72: 310-318. 
17 Bowling & Dieppe, Martinson & Berridge, Timonen. 
18 An exception is Jan Baars, who also points out this shortcoming. J. Baars. 2012. Aging 
and the art of living. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: x, 283 p. 
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consideration of human aging. Once these gerontological conceptions enter public 
policies, they also have other normative implications beyond the prudential 
quality of their recommendations. How one “ought” to live in order to achieve a 
flourishing old age may easily become how one “ought” to live as an aging citizen 
who meets her duties towards society.19 For instance, people could be held 
responsible if they fail to meet the standards of “successful aging” by making 
them pay higher health insurance fees or co-payments. This can also lead to a risk-
averse society which gives health an absolute priority at the cost of a pluralism of 
values.20 The fifth expert report on aging for the German government, spells out 
this claim that risks for healthy aging can be eliminated completely by appropriate 
life styles, which illustrates this concern.21 On the other hand, the preconditions 
for successful, active, or healthy aging can justify claims that individuals have 
towards society, insofar as individual achievements in this respect depend on 
specific social conditions. This way “aging well” also defines duties society has 
towards its aging citizens.  
In philosophy, there are very few classical monographs on aging. Cicero’s de 
Senectute22 written 44 BC is followed by Simone de Beauvoir’s La Vieillesse23 from 
1970. Only recently have some philosophers tried to close this gap.24 But there is 
no systematic examination of the relation between gerontological conceptions of 
                                                          
19 Ibid., p.1. 
20 J. Savulescu. Golden opportunity, reasonable risk and personal responsibility for health. 
Journal of medical ethics 2017. 
21 Bundesministerium für Familie Senioren Frauen und Jugend. Fünfter Bericht zur Lage 
der älteren Generation in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  2005. 23. 
22 M.T. Cicero & J.G.F. Powell. 1988. Cato Maior de senectute. Cambridge 
[Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press: ix, 298 p. ;. 
23 S.d. Beauvoir. 1970. La vieillesse. Paris: Gallimard: 604 p. 
24 Baars 2012, op. cit., note 18, H. Small. 2007. The long life. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: xi, 346 p.  
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aging well and the theory of the good life.25 The authors who have contributed to 
the revival of the theory of the good life are no exception. Neither Alaistair 
McInytre26, nor Phillippa Foot27, nor Martha Nussbaum28 have written extensively 
about aging.  
The situation in bioethics is not much different. The interests of bioethicists have 
often focused on anti-aging medicine and lifespan extension.29 Population aging 
has generated an interest in the ethical implications of some specific medical 
challenges such as dementia.30 But to our knowledge there are no contributions in 
bioethics which have examined normative conceptions in gerontology and their 
implications for medicine and health care more closely. There is no systematic 
gerontological ethics or geroethics that develops the connection between 
gerontology, ethics and bioethics. The objective of this article is to develop the 
outlines of such a research program.  
We develop this research program for a systematic global geroethics in four steps. 
First, we analyze „successful aging“ as put forward by Rowe and Kahn as a 
paradigmatic example for a gerontological conception of aging well. We point out 
the implicit evaluative claims of this conception which relate to the theory of the 
                                                          
25 This includes a chapter of Diane Jeske on „Aging, Getting Older, and the Good Life“ in G. 
Scarre (ed.). 2016. The Palgrave handbook of the philosophy of aging. New York, NY: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.  
26 A.C. MacIntyre. After virtue : a study in moral theory. 
27 P. Foot. 2001. Natural goodness. Oxford: Clarendon. 
28 Oxford University Press has announced a book on aging by Martha Nussbaum for 
January 2018, retrieved from https://global.oup.com/academic/product/aging-
thoughtfully-9780190600235?cc=de&lang=en&.  
29 See for instance: C. Farrelly. Framing the inborn aging process and longevity science. 
Biogerontology 2010; 11: 377-385, S. Horrobin. The Ethics of Aging Intervention and Life-
Extension. Aging Interventions and Therapies World Scientific Publishers, Singapore 2005, 
H. Jonas. The burden and blessing of mortality. Hastings Center Report 1992; 22: 34-40, J. 
Harris. Immortal ethics. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 2004; 1019: 527-534, 
E.T. Juengst, et al. Biogerontology,“anti‐aging medicine,” and the challenges of human 
enhancement. Hastings Center Report 2003; 33: 21-30. 
30 C. Baldwin, et al. Ethics and dementia: mapping the literature by bibliometric analysis. 
Int J Geriatr Psychiatry 2003; 18: 41-54, J. Hughes & J. Common. Ethical issues in caring for 
patients with dementia. Nurs Stand 2015; 29: 42-47. 
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good life. Then, in a second step, we move from criticism within gerontology to an 
ethical perspective; in particular, we want to clarify the problem of the claim of 
universal validity of conceptions of the good life. Such claims have to be 
compatible with a variation of conceptions of the good in a pluralist society and in 
different cultures. In a third constructive step we explain how the capabilities 
approach (CA) could be applied in this context as a normative foundation for the 
implicit normative assumptions of gerontological conceptions of aging well such 
as a particular choice of functionings, the ethical relevance of human agency, and 
the resulting claims of individuals towards society. Finally, using a conception by 
the German philosopher Ursula Wolf, we systematically develop the different 
aspects of the connection between aging well and the theory of the good life in 
their full complexity and show their interconnectedness.  
ROWE AND KAHN’S CONCEPT OF „SUCCESSFUL AGING“  
John W. Rowe, a medical doctor, and Robert L. Kahn, a psychologist developed 
their concept of “successful aging” by both appreciating and departing from the 
gerontological distinction between pathological and normal aging. In their seminal 
article published in 1987, they support this distinction as an important correction 
of the prevailing idea that aging and old age are necessarily and wholly 
characterized by pathologies. Nevertheless, they believed that there is still the 
third and further possibility of improving the way people age and experience old 
age. To show this possibility, they identify people who age successfully as a third 
group in addition to those who suffer from a specific pathology and those who 
age normally. “Normal” or “usual” aging in this sense would still be characterized 
by an increased risk for disease or disability. In contrast, the third group 
experiencing “successful aging” is defined by a low probability of disease and 
disability.  
9 
 
The low risk of disease and disability is only one of the three components of the 
definition of “„successful aging” by Rowe and Kahn. The second component is a 
high level of cognitive and physical functioning. And the third is an “active 
engagement with life”.31 These three components are broken down into subparts 
which can be as detailed as specific physiological measures such as bone density32. 
“Active engagement with life” has two main elements: interpersonal relations and 
activities which produce social value. Such social value activities are not 
necessarily reimbursed directly, but could be measured in economic terms and 
are contributing to the GDP.33 It is also in this third component that the distinction 
between the definition of “successful aging” and its implicit conception of the 
good becomes apparent, which we will analyze in more detail below. Taken 
together, Rowe and Kahn’s components of “successful aging” are, in effect, 
criteria which define desired outcomes of “success” in old age. Successful agers 
cannot only be identified by these criteria, but they can also serve as role models 
for others on how to achieve the desired outcomes. In their 1997 book, Rowe and 
Kahn collected the corresponding prudential recommendations.  
The primary focus of Rowe and Kahn is on biomedical health and not general 
wellbeing. This becomes clear from their focus on the distinctions between 
pathological, usual aging characterized by high risk of disease and „successful 
aging“. From this perspective, aging is foremost a challenge to one’s health, and 
which should be met with different responses. Its primary focus is on individual 
behavior and, therefore, many critics have blamed Rowe and Kahn for not 
sufficiently considering the social context of individual health and, consequently, 
of „successful aging“. Rowe and Kahn have recently acknowledged that it is 
                                                          
31 Rowe and Kahn 1997, op. cit. note 1. 
32 Rowe and Kahn 1987, op. cit. note 1. 
33 Rowe and Kahn 2015. op. cit. note 1.  
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increasingly necessary to take this into account.34 However, they also argue that 
their concept always had a social aspect.35   
And, indeed, the third component defining “successful aging” goes beyond the 
focus on individual health in a different sense from the social aspect. This 
reference to agency and activity establishes the most direct link between the 
definition of “successful aging“ and the theory of the good life. The third 
component defines not only the potential to act or function, but also defines the 
kind of activities they should be able to do (activities of economic value), i.e. 
activities older people have reason to value and society has reason to support 
them doing.  
Rowe and Kahn define the desirable activities in terms of economic value. This is 
simply too narrow as a criterion for “successful aging” in a literal sense, since 
people might have reason to value old age beyond the mere possibility to engage 
in such activities. It is, therefore, no surprise that it is regarding this third 
component that many disagreements in gerontology arise and alternative 
suggestions are made. These are often based on different sets of values, for 
instance, in the alternative model of “active aging”.36  As a case in point, Foster 
and Walker suggest broadening this narrow economic focus. They ask for an 
extended definition of activity which “should include all meaningful pursuits that 
contribute to individual well-being”.37 Here again, the connection to the theory of 
the good life is clearly established by the terms “meaningful” and “well-being”, 
                                                          
34 J.W. Rowe & R.L. Kahn. Successful Aging 2.0: Conceptual Expansions for the 21st 
Century. The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 
2015; 70: 593-596. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See note 2. 
37 Foster & Walker. op. cit. note 2. 
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which are also left undefined in Foster’s and Walker’s article. Below we will show 
how the CA can be used to fulfil this gap.  
The discussion on activities in different gerontological conceptions which qualify 
„aging“ and „old age“ as successful should raise the question of how such 
activities can be selected and how this selection can be justified. In particular, 
there is a claim of universal validity for all human beings as implied in the title of 
the seminal article by Rowe and Kahn: „Human aging: usual and successful“. The 
far-reaching consequences of this strong claim also become apparent in a recent 
call of Rowe and Kahn to “reengineer core societal institutions” in order to adapt 
them to the “needs and capacities of older populations”. Gerontological 
conceptions of aging well claim to play a key role in such a reengineering and 
there are indeed examples for research programs and national and international 
policies on aging and old age which have been shaped by them. Rowe and Kahn 
mention several academic “successful aging” centers as well as the MacArthur 
Foundation for “successful aging” and the development of recommendations for 
“specific policies to facilitate the emergence of a successfully aging society”. Such 
policies have been adopted by different international organizations such as the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and the European Union (EU).38 The EU has 
adopted the active aging model with a focus on economic aspects and its strong 
appraisal of older people’s employment opportunities and independence. For 
example, the Guiding Principles for Active Aging and Solidarity between 
Generations39 recommend a variety of goals to support independent living. This is 
an illustrative example of our initial claim how narrow conceptions of the good – 
based on “activity of economic value” can enter policy guidelines. Thus, they 
                                                          
38 For an overview see: ibid.  
39 Council of the European Union. 2012. Council Declaration on the European Year for 
Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations Brussels: Council of the European 
Union. 
12 
 
contribute to the reshaping of social institutions – as Rowe and Kahn, as quoted 
above, also ask for – on a doubtful value foundation potentially contradicting 
social pluralism. Consequently, the needs of older people for support in the 
pursuit of activities which are important for a flourishing life may fall outside the 
scope of these guidelines. The same applies for conceptions of “successful aging” 
from a different cultural background. 
CRITICISM OF „SUCCESSFUL AGING“: INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURAL PLURALITY OF 
THE GOOD  
As we pointed out, gerontological conceptions such as “successful aging” contain 
broader implicit normative claims on how to lead a good life rather than just the 
narrow focus on health and functioning as initially suggested. The influence on 
social policies in order to reshape society and the reference to human aging in 
general terms also underline how strong these claims are. In contradiction to the 
broadness and influence of these normative claims, the underlying conception of 
the good is neither well-justified nor fully developed in its complexity. Within the 
field of gerontology itself, “successful aging” has been criticised for various 
reasons. One important criticism implicitly refers to the lack of recognition for 
pluralism of values in the “successful aging” concept. Some critics contend that 
the perspectives of older people and their individual and cultural diversity are not 
sufficiently considered by Rowe and Kahn.40  
Many studies have indeed found that older people themselves value a broad and 
diverse range of goods that are not represented in “successful aging” models. 
Among others, these include emotional and spiritual well-being, self-acceptance 
and self-contentment, acceptance of change of the aging process, a sense of 
                                                          
40 M. Martinson & C. Berridge. Successful Aging and Its Discontents: A Systematic Review 
of the Social Gerontology Literature. The Gerontologist 2015; 55: 58-69. 
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humor, autonomy, financial security, living in a pleasant and safe neighborhood, 
and physical appearance.41 As can be seen from the variety, there is considerable 
diversity among individuals - much more than most scientific models of 
“successful aging” allow for. 
An example of a different cultural understanding of aging can be found in the 
work of the Dutch anthropologist van der Geest, who did fieldwork among the 
Aku in southern Ghana for two decades, focusing mainly on the understanding of 
aging and attitudes towards old age.42 The term he uses to describe ideals of aging 
in Ghanese culture is not ‘successful’ aging, but ‘graceful’ aging, which obviously 
has different connotations. Interestingly, van der Geest observes that the local 
language of the people he studied does not have a term for ‘old’ as an adjective 
for people. Instead, the verb ‘to grow’ is used. The way to express ‘I am old’ in the 
language of the Aku people would be to say ‘I have grown’. Aging is thus seen as 
growth rather than as decline. Moreover, the most common term to refer to an 
old person is a title that expresses admiration and affection.  
Van der Geest describes how in Aku culture the ideal of aging ‘gracefully’ implies 
that old people are respected by younger generations and valued for their 
wisdom and life experience. Old age is appreciated as a positive phase in life and 
elderly persons are seen as honorable, civilised, kind, composed, and wise. Van 
der Geest points out that this positive image of old age as respected and valued 
may be more of a normative ideal than actual practice – similar to the Western 
notion of ‘successful’ aging, and therefore being a reflection of an ideal and not 
necessarily describing the actual condition of old people. Such ideals set standards 
                                                          
41 Ibid., Rowe & Kahn. op. cit. note 8. and Bowling & Dieppe. 
42 S. Van der Geest. 2012. Graceful and Successful Ageing: Observations from Ghana and 
the Netherlands. In Alter(n) anders denken Kulturelle und biologische Perspektiven. d.J.W. 
Röder B, Alt KW ed. Köln: Böhlau Verlag  
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of conduct and character: old people in southern Ghana are supposed to have 
virtues of wisdom, self-constraint, and dedication to their family, just as Western 
seniors are supposed to be active, healthy, and youthful.  
When models that disregard individual and cultural differences are used for 
policymaking purposes, as in the policies and policy guidance by Rowe and Kahn 
we have referred to above, there is a risk of stigmatizing and discriminating 
certain groups of people, and of failing to cater to their needs. When success is 
measured according to certain culture-specific criteria, groups in which there are 
a different set of criteria and other values can be wrongfully labelled as 
unsuccessful and problematic.43 Likewise, ‘active social participation’ may not be 
valued equally by all groups, and even people who share the goals promoted by 
“successful aging” could lack the resources and opportunities to achieve them. As 
a consequence, they may face an unjustified personal feeling of failure and an 
unfair negative evaluation of their own situation and responsibility for their own 
lack of success in a society aligned to ideas of “successful aging”.44 
As a consequence, policy strategies aimed at aging well might be ineffective or 
even harmful for certain individuals or groups. For example, policies that facilitate 
and promote independent living for older people may impede their opportunities 
to live with family or to be taken care of in a facility for the elderly. Furthermore, 
policies focusing on the promotion of a healthy lifestyle may succeed in improving 
health at an old age but could be ineffective when it comes to achieving 
“successful aging” as it is perceived by the people themselves. Such as when they 
fail to promote building social networks or to improve financial security in old age. 
                                                          
43 For example, some cultural groups attach less importance to self-sufficiency and 
independent living and thus do not consider dependence a sign of failure. Policies that 
consider dependency to be one of the bigger issues and, therefore, something to be 
avoided will likely discriminate and stigmatise these groups. 
44 Ibid. 
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These problems point to the general requirement of a better justification of the 
conception of the good which is included in gerontological conceptions of aging 
well. Such a justification can be found in the Capabilities Approach (CA). 
CAPABILITIES AND AGING WELL  
The CA is a broad analytical and normative framework that redefines the concepts 
of individual human well-being as well as social development. 45 When used in the 
analysis of human wellbeing, the CA perspective starts out by asking this 
fundamental question: “What are people actually able to be and to do in their 
daily lives?”  
Five constitutive elements characterize this framework46. The first concept is of 
capability itself. Capabilities represent the actual possible opportunities that a 
person achieves as being the valuable doings and beings in her daily life. A 
person’s capability is made up of the combined interaction of internal and 
external factors. These include a person’s internal endowments such as biology, 
knowledge, and skills as well as the external environment including social, 
material, and environmental factors. This is vitally important as there is a 
difference between a simple or formal opportunity versus the capability concept, 
which focuses on real, practical possibility. Some frequently used examples of 
capabilities include being able to live a long and healthy life, being able to become 
educated or well-nourished; being able to participate in valued productive 
activities; not feeling ashamed in public and interacting as an equal social 
                                                          
45 A. Sen. 1985. Commodities and capabilities. Amsterdam; Oxford: North-Holland, A. Sen. 
1992. Inequality re-examined Oxford: Oxford University Press, A. Sen. 1999. Development 
as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, A. Sen. 2009. The idea of justice. London: 
Allen Lane. 
46 For a theoretical introduction to the CA see also I. Robeyns. The capability approach: a 
theoretical survey. J Hum Dev Capabil 2005; 6: 93-117, I. Robeyns. The capability approach 
in practice. Journal of Political Philosophy 2006; 14: 351–376. 
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member; and being able to express one’s political preferences.47  All these 
capabilities are seen to be valuable dimensions of a good life. 
The second element is the notion of functionings. These are the realizations of 
capabilities into end achievements – the valued “beings and doings” – that an 
individual has chosen to pursue. The functionings correlated with the capabilities 
examples mentioned above would be living a long life without impairments, 
becoming educated; becoming well-nourished; participating in valued productive 
activities; not feeling ashamed in public, and expressing one’s political 
preferences such as actually voting. Therefore, while capabilities represent the 
real opportunity/freedom aspect (being free and able to be or to do something), 
functionings refer to achieved beings or doings.  
An important question that arises is which capabilities and functionings are 
valuable? On the one hand, the CA has a strong line of ethical argument about 
individuals being able to choose to realize the capabilities and functionings that 
they personally have reason to value. On the other hand, the concept of 
capabilities is not meant to be a superficial concept describing people’s daily 
mundane beings and doings (e.g. being able to use a particular kind of soap). The 
concept of a capability is related to human wellbeing and to concepts such as 
moral equality and social justice. Capabilities that constitute wellbeing have to be 
morally significant and identified through a rigorous process of reasoning.  
Amartya Sen argues that there should not be one standard list of capabilities 
identified for all societies. Instead, each society must endeavor through public 
reasoning to identify the basic capabilities it wants to guarantee all its members.  
                                                          
47 M. Nussbaum. 2011. Creating capabilities. The human development approach. Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, M. Nussbaum. 2000. Women and Human Development: the 
Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum. 
Nussbaum (2011) distinguishes further three different notions of capabilities, namely 
basic, internal and combined capabilities.   
17 
 
However, when pressed for some indication of important capabilities, he does 
identify some basic capabilities that all societies might share in common. 48  
Given the moral or normative aspects of capabilities and functionings they have 
certain characteristics: they are plural since people value multiple beings and 
doings, and a good life contains many things not just one; they are qualitatively 
distinct and, therefore, cannot be conflated or reduced to a single index or metric 
(such as income!) without generating distortion; they are shaped by values and 
reasons. That is, capabilities are identified through public and individual reasoning 
about a minimally decent human life in the modern world rather than reflecting 
facts of human biology or nature. Finally, although both capabilities and 
functionings are core concepts in the CA, the primary evaluative space is that of 
capabilities. This is because the CA considers the freedom of an individual to 
conceive, plan and pursue their own conception of a good life and the process 
through which outcomes are achieved to be of analytical, ethical, and political 
importance.  
A third key concept is agency. Sen defines agency as the ability to pursue goals 
that one values and has reason to value.49. Agency enables people to expand their 
freedoms and “[freedom] is also a principal determinant of individual initiative 
and social effectiveness.”50. Thus freedom and agency are mutually enhancing 
components of development: greater freedom enhances the ability of people to 
                                                          
48 A. Sen. Capabilities, Lists, and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation. Feminist 
Economics 2004; 10: 77-80. See also Nussbaum. op. cit. note 26. 
49 The opposite of a person with agency is someone who is forced, oppressed or passive. S. 
Alkire. 2002. Valuing freedoms : Sen's capability approach and poverty reduction. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, A.S.a.D. S. 2009. The human development and capability 
approach. In An introduction to the human development and capability approach freedom 
and agency, . S.S. Deneulin, Lila, ed. Sterling, Va. Ottawa, Ont: Earthscan International 
Development Research Centre: 22-48. 
50 Sen 1999, op. cit. note 24. 
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be agents, while agency also enables people to demand and achieve further 
freedoms allowing them to contribute both to their own development and to that 
of their community.  
The fourth constitutive element is the idea of individual endowments, the amount 
(and quality) of resources (‘things’) available to the individuals. They include 
biological and mental features, private means (income, wealth, physical assets), 
public goods and services which are all instrumental to creating capabilities. The 
last key element of the CA is the notion of conversion factors. Conversion factors 
reflect people’s different personal, social and environmental characteristics which 
affect – either in a positive or a negative sense – their ability to effectively access 
and convert their endowments and external conditions into effective 
capabilities.51.  
As stated above, conceptualizing aging and old age in terms of basic capabilities 
will prove fruitful for both gerontologists as well as philosophers of human 
wellbeing and social justice. The CA can both contribute important conceptual 
distinctions and substantial definitions to the respective debates. It helps to 
differentiate between what people are able to do according to their capabilities 
and between their actual achievements. From the perspective of conceptions of 
aging well, this would help to distinguish better between factors which contribute 
to aging well – capabilities in terms of endowments and conversion factors – and 
outcomes in terms of functionings as achievements. The CA would also be helpful 
to broaden the conception of activities which people have reason to value 
                                                          
51 Examples of personal conversion factors are age, ethnicity, gender, physical condition 
and presence of disabilities. Social conversion factors usually refer to family socio-
economic background and characteristics of the social contexts where people live. 
Environmental conversion factors are mostly connected to the natural environment, the 
climate conditions etc.  
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understood from mere activities of economic value to capabilities and 
functionings. It can provide a theoretical framework for the justification of a 
particular set of capabilities and functionings in terms of public and individual 
reasoning of a minimally decent human life. And finally it highlights the necessity 
of the social context including resources and positive freedoms for the realization 
of the respective capabilities as functionings. At the same time gerontological 
knowledge will also improve the CA’s understanding how the process of aging 
may influence one’s agency and endowments and how age constitutes a 
conversion factor for effective capabilities. Therefore a dialogue and cooperation 
between gerontology and the theory of the good life, here represented by the CA 
would be highly desirable, and constitutes a major task for both fields.52 
„AGING WELL“ AND THE FIVE LEVELS OF THE QUESTION OF THE “GOOD LIFE”  
The Capabilities Approach can provide a better justification for the third 
component, the choice of activities and human agency in “successful aging”. This 
is applicable to comparable components in other gerontological conceptions of 
aging well. Further, the Capabilities Approach can point to the social 
preconditions and context of human agency beyond the primary focus on 
individual responsibility. However, agency declines with old age and while indeed 
the “younger old” can enjoy a phase of life of activity, this applies to a lesser 
degree to the “older old” or “oldest old”. Indeed some gerontologists have called 
the “oldest old” or the “fourth age” as sign of the fundamental imperfection of 
                                                          
52 Indeed, the WHO has already begun to set this into practice by promoting healthy aging 
on a more comprehensive approach. It is based on the ‘social model’ of disability and 
Capabilities Approach and correspondingly on a wider set of functional abilities to achieve 
well-being. See: World Health Organisation. 2015. World Report on Ageing and Health. 
Geneva: World Health Organisation. 
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human life.53 Since it excludes many people of a more advanced age, the 
narrowness of “successful aging” as defined by Rowe and Kahn becomes even 
clearer in this respect. An alternative model such as the Ghanian one might be 
better able to accommodate dependency, but its perspective might as well 
underestimate the relevance of negative experiences of a very advanced old age. 
How can the theory of the good life address this problem? 
First of all, a better distinction of the different levels of the theory of a good life is 
helpful to clarify the different problems it has to address in this context. A useful 
tool for this purpose is the German philosopher Ursula Wolf’s insightful analysis of 
the structure of the question of the good life54. According to Wolf the question of 
the good life can be formulated as: “Which way to live is good for human beings?” 
Or even simpler from an individual perspective: “How should I live?” This latter 
formulation has five different levels; the first level is addressed in the additional 
form: “How should I live here and now?” This refers to the actual situation of a 
person, her desires, abilities, past, resources, and cultural context. The second 
level addresses a possible conflict between preferences of different goals which a 
person considers to be good. Wolf’s example is the desire to run away from 
danger and the desire to be courageous. This leads to the third level, on which 
somebody questions virtues, values, ideals, and cultural justifications of goals 
which are specific for a particular society. For instance, by following one’s own 
inclinations one may reject the virtue of courage as it is understood in the culture 
to which one belongs. On the fourth level a person takes the perspective of her 
life in its completeness: “Which model for a life do I want to follow?” This refers 
                                                          
53 P.B. Baltes. Facing our limits: human dignity in the very old. Daedalus-Us 2006; 135: 32-
39, K. Aner & I. Fooken. Age(ing) and ambivalence. Zeitschrift fur Gerontologie und 
Geriatrie 2016; 49: 1-2. 
54 U. Wolf. 1999. Die Philosophie und die Frage nach dem guten Leben. Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt. 
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to the possibilities that are available to an individual with a particular set of 
dispositions and in a particular context over a longer period of time as well as his 
or her biography. Finally, the fifth - and according to Wolf – the deepest of these 
levels refers to existential crises, contingency, and death and how we can live a 
good life in the face of these challenges.  
This distinction helps to outline the possible integration of gerontological 
conceptions of aging well and the theory of the good life in a better way. On the 
first level, the question can be raised whether the components of ”successful 
aging” are appropriate, particularly in relation to individual agency and activities 
which are part of a good life. On this level and also as a fundament for others, the 
Capability Approach provides a helpful orientation on what it means to age well. 
On the second level, there may be conflicting desires regarding how to age well, 
and how important preventive behavior and healthy life styles (“factors” 
according to Rowe and Kahn) are compared to other preferences with which it 
may come into conflict. Such conflicts have to be decided on the third level where 
life models, general cultural values and ideals are identified and particular desires 
are evaluated. On the forth level, the context of life as a whole and its individual 
possibilities have to be considered and different options, which have been 
suggested in a more scattered form throughout the history of philosophy, have to 
be examined more closely. Is old age a part of one’s life accomplishment and 
fulfillment of one’s life’s work and an opportunity to realize the meaning of 
human finitude as Thomas Rentsch55 has written? Or is this an illusion and it is 
rather a phase in which the pieces of one’s life and work drift apart as Noberto 
                                                          
55 T. Rentsch. 2016. Aging as Becoming Oneself: A Philosophical Ethics of Late Life. In The 
Palgrave handbook of the philosophy of aging. G. Scarre (ed.), ed. New York, NY: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg: 347-364. 
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Bobbio56 has believed? Finally, aging and old age might be closely connected to 
Wolf’s challenges which may lead to existential crises: finitude, limited time, and 
death. How should we deal with the negative aspects and ambivalence57 of old 
age and integrate them in a concept of the good life? What are the limits of an 
“art of living” addressing these problems or indeed which different ways are there 
to conceive of such an art?58  
On this fifth level, one of the key challenges of a global geroethics in order to 
allow aging and older people a positive experience of old age is to develop 
strategies of how to deal with negative aspects of physical aging and old age. At 
first this may seem paradoxical. The difficulty is not to relativize or simply deny 
negative aspects of old age while at the same time avoiding negative stereotypes 
of old age. There are many examples for apologetics of old age which propose to 
change the perspective on age-related losses and treat them as advantages. The 
most prominent example is Cicero’s De Senectute. Cicero suggests that a loss in 
sexual function should be welcomed since it allows concentrating on more 
important things in life. Jan Baars seems to be sympathetic to this view, at least to 
some degree: “Fortunately, there are still stories about continuing love beyond a 
‘sexually healthy’ lifestyle”. He sees the qualification of diminishing sexual interest 
or capacities in old age as part of a problematic anti-aging culture. But in a 
pluralistic society it is difficult to argue for a particular attitude towards sexual 
functioning and to a particular kind of sexual activity in advanced age as the result 
of some inauthentic desire generated by an “anti-aging-culture”. In fact there are 
many different ways how older people experience their sexual activities.  This 
example points to the more general problem how to deal with physical aging, 
                                                          
56 N. Bobbio & A. Cameron. 2001. Old age and other essays. Cambridge: Polity. 
57 Aner & Foken 2016, op. cit., note 52. 
58 Baars 2012, op. cit., note 18. 
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which biologists define as an “increasing vulnerability to environmental challenge 
and a growing risk of disease and death.”  Thus, preventing aging is also 
decreasing the risk of disease.  However, for some authors a medical approach to 
tackle the aging process itself is deemed a fundamentally misguided attitude 
towards aging and the experience of human finitude it enables.  On the fifth and 
deepest level of Wolf’s analysis of the question of a good life, the problem then is 
how to deal with human finitude from the perspective of the theory of a good life. 
While the authors named above have argued that human existence is exclusively 
characterized by finitude and to accept this is key to a good life, there are 
alternative perspectives which have scarcely been addressed in this context. For 
instance, Paul Ricoeur has argued that human existence is also characterized by 
an infinite aspect and by overcoming finitude. 
CONCLUSION 
These open questions point to an ambitious research program which is necessary 
to address the different problems raised by the connection between aging well 
and the theory of the good life. Our intention is not to replace gerontological 
conceptions of aging well, which are certainly useful to achieve an improved 
health in older age. This is without any doubt a goal that people have reason to 
value. Rather we want to point out their limitations and how they could benefit 
from an elaborated exchange with the theory of a good life. In turn, this theory 
can also benefit from such an exchange. The shortcomings we have identified 
include the following: the conception of the good implied in concepts such as 
“successful aging” is too narrow and not sufficiently justified. The complexity of 
the question of the good life is consequently not properly addressed, thus 
becoming particularly problematic once gerontological conceptions of “aging 
well” shape national and international policies. Then the needs of different 
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cultural and social groups would in all likelihood not be adequately addressed. At 
the same time, aging populations are  now a global phenomenon and a global 
geroethics is required in order to support aging and older people and foster a 
positive experience of old age. We have outlined how the CA could contribute to 
such a global geroethics by enabling people with their choice and realization of 
particular options how to lead a good life facing the challenges of aging. 
Obviously developing, justifying, and formulating a full theory of global geroethics 
would be a major task in an interdisciplinary dialogue, which would also require 
engagement with other approaches like the theory of a good life and ethics in 
general in order to address all five of Wolff’s levels. A global geroethics has two 
fundamental tasks: establishing a fundamental justification for the concepts of the 
good in gerontology, and integrating gerontological knowledge into the theory of 
a good life on all five levels Wolf identifies.  
 
 
 
 
 
